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Jihadist groups operating in Central Asia pose a real threat, but they are not the only or even the
primary danger facing the region’s regimes.
 
The states of Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan—are closely watching the political situation in Afghanistan, a neighbor with whom three
of them share a border. This situation concerns them very deeply.
Central Asian governments view with alarm and pessimism the withdrawal by the end of 2014 of
most of the Western troops that have been present in Afghanistan since a NATO-led security
mission began in 2001. Kabul’s neighbors expect the already-unstable situation in Afghanistan to
deteriorate and threaten their own security and stability. They fear that a radical Islamist regime in
Afghanistan will emerge from a Taliban military victory—a scenario that many Central Asian leaders
and analysts believe is inevitable and will spill over across Afghanistan’s northern border.1 
Such concerns have sometimes been expressed openly in recent years, for example by Tokon
Mamytov, the chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security, who
feared an incursion from Afghanistan into his homeland even in 2013 or 2014. Observers who live
far away from the Afghan regional environment, or who have forgotten recent history, may see such
reactions with cynicism. But for those who remember the impact that the 1979–1989 Soviet war in
Afghanistan had on radical Islamist and jihadist movements in the Arab world and Southeast Asia,
regional concerns are no laughing matter.
How likely is Central Asia to become a hotbed of radical Islamic ideologies on the eve of the
planned Western withdrawal from Afghanistan? A simplistic answer—that there is no real threat or,
on the contrary, that Central Asian leaders will face hell on earth after 2014—is not appropriate. To
say that Central Asian jihadism emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan has no influence on the
region’s security after 2014 would be to ignore both geography and common knowledge about the
main Central Asian jihadist groups. The threat from these groups is real, but it should not be seen
as the only danger, or even the main one, facing Central Asian regimes.
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Defining the Jihadist Threat
The term “jihadist threat” is used in this article with a distinct, specific meaning: a Salafist or radical
Islamic approach that does not seek to conquer hearts and minds. Other Islamists with strong
political organizations, such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey’s Justice and Development
Party (AKP), or Tunisia’s Ennahda party, have adopted more pragmatic and moderate positions.
Jihadists, however, seek to impose their ideas on others by force—first through terrorism and then,
if possible, by seizing power and instituting a government crackdown on any vision that runs counter
to their ideology.
Of course, with such an approach to governing, jihadists are never attractive to a large number of
people, as they have no true socially oriented, grassroots strategy. These groups are in fact no
more than small cells or, as they consider themselves, a “vanguard.” The fact that jihadists are
always relatively few in numbers may explain why scholars and security professionals do not take
them seriously—until they manage to pull off a spectacular, large-scale attack.
The perfect example of the effects of limited numbers is al-Qaeda. For even this most well-known
jihadist group, its small size means that the maximum effect it can achieve with an attack is when a
state commits a major political error in response. Such mistakes include invading a country that had
nothing to do with the attack, ratcheting up diplomatic tensions, or cracking down on a religious or
ethnic minority.
As soon as a state commits one of these faux pas, the jihadists can use their extremist discourse to
its maximum advantage and fuel the vicious cycle of attacks, crackdowns, and recruitment that is
key to their existence. A final defining feature of jihadists is that their ideological radicalism,
tendency to form small groups, and lack of interest in nonviolent political influence lead them to
eschew traditional national loyalties.2
Central Asian Jihadist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan
There are two significant jihadist groups originating in post-Soviet Central Asia: the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU).3 The latter seceded from the
former after the “emirate” of Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar was toppled by the
international security mission in 2001. That made the IMU the historical jihadist movement for
post-Soviet Central Asia.
Beginnings
The IMU, Central Asia’s largest jihadist group, was born out of local issues. The movement’s
predecessor, Adolat (Justice), appeared in the eastern Uzbek city of Namangan in the early 1990s
as a reaction to the shock and local disorganization that resulted from the fall of the Soviet Union.
In the Fergana Valley, a region that forms the historical heart of Central Asia, the negative impact of
the collapse of Communism was particularly strong on the “new poor”—industrial and construction
workers and the employees of institutions and firms previously funded by the Soviet state—as well
as the unemployed youth. At the same time, this region experienced the loss of a welfare state, the
rise of criminal gangs and profiteers that the police was unable or unwilling to oppose, and the
disappearance of any ideological goal.
Some of the disenchanted youth, influenced by a brand of Salafism promoted in particular by young
local mullahs like Tahir Yuldashev, organized themselves as an Islamist militia. Adolat was born.
The group helped impose order, track down and punish criminals, and regulate prices in local
markets.
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By the end of 1991, it became apparent that this new force wanted to do more than promote justice.
Adolat, which had clearly expressed its radical Islamist views, had ambitions that went beyond
controlling the Uzbek part of the Fergana Valley. The group tried to impose its beliefs on the whole
new state of Uzbekistan and to gain control through an insurrection, with the help of the country’s
Islamist and non-Islamist opposition.
Faced with such a threat, the only reaction that the country’s post-Soviet regime could offer was
repression. From the beginning of 1992, the Uzbek government organized a systematic crackdown
against any type of opposition, even against the most legalist groups. Later, militias were sent to the
Fergana Valley to destroy Adolat and any other vigilante groups not directly controlled by the state.
For those that were not arrested or eliminated, exile was the only option.
Exile
Uzbeks who were sympathetic to the views of Islamism in general and to the Uzbek jihadist
movement in particular had no other choice but to go into exile, often with their families, living in the
group’s training camps in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Going to these camps was a one-way ticket to
greater radicalism, as they were as much a place for ideology as for military training.
During the 1990s, the Uzbek jihadist movement was more structured overseas than in Uzbekistan
itself, under the double leadership of Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani, the group’s ideologue
and military chief, respectively. Yuldashev was the Uzbek jihadists’ emissary to various foreign
countries, and he sought ties and support notably in Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. He lived in
Peshawar from 1995 to 1998 and made contact with various Afghan Islamist groups, including the
Taliban, and Arab jihadists, and was finally introduced to al-Qaeda’s founder, Osama bin Laden. In
Afghanistan and Pakistan, a rapprochement between ideological forces was taking place that went
beyond simple Islamic nationalism.4
The militants supposedly carried out some jihadist acts in Uzbekistan after being exiled at the
beginning of the 1990s. But the rebels’ capacity to recruit and develop inside the country was
limited, as the regime in Tashkent decided to be uncompromising even with minor signs of
opposition, to make it clear to all that regime change was not possible—at least, not by internal
revolt.
The Uzbek jihadist movement therefore found it difficult to have a direct impact inside Uzbekistan,
where it faced an uncompromising regime, but was able to find a safe haven elsewhere—first in
Tajikistan, then in Afghanistan. These general circumstances made the group a de facto Central
Asian jihadist movement, and it became known as the IMU from 1998 onward. By this time,
although the majority of the group’s fighters were Uzbek, the IMU also contained Tajiks, Kyrgyz, and
even Uighurs.
The Uzbek secret service pursued these militants and other opposition members elsewhere in
Central Asia, where they were waging a regional war against the jihadists. Uzbek intelligence
services have organized kidnappings of Uzbek Islamists, for example in southern Kyrgyzstan, often
without consulting the Kyrgyz authorities.
Between 1999 and 2005, no fewer than 8,000 people were arrested on suspicion of being Islamists.
Only 1,500 were released after being arrested, and many of those who remained incarcerated died
in custody from mistreatment or disease. This policy of detention applied not only to Islamists: from
the beginning of the 2000s to 2012, at least ten opponents of the regime of President Islam Karimov
were brought back to Uzbekistan and imprisoned, according to human rights activists.
Tajik Civil War
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At the same time that Uzbek Islamist rebels were losing their fight against Tashkent, a civil war
began between the Tajik government and an Islamist opposition. The Uzbek jihadists took part in
the fight on the side of the Islamists but became disillusioned with their Tajik comrades-in-arms
when the latter found a compromise with Dushanbe in 1997. While many Tajik fighters were
Islamists in a very moderate, political way, repression had already made the Uzbeks more radical.
Tashkent rejected the 1997 peace agreement between Tajik Islamists and the Tajik government.
That same year, the Uzbek army beefed up its presence on the country’s border with Afghanistan,
to show the Uzbek jihadists that no political process backed by military pressure would lead to an
agreement with the ruling power. Yet some militants were inspired enough by the Tajik example and
by the feeling that their cause was regionally successful to wish to force Tashkent with violence to
negotiate a political settlement.5 Yuldashev seems to have been one such individual, or at least
someone who was influenced by such ideas.
A Radical Approach
As a group, the Uzbek jihadists did not opt for a moderate approach. Namangani’s ideological vision
was not well developed, but he was vehemently against the regime in Tashkent and wanted nothing
less than its destruction. His radical approach gained traction when he began to impose his
leadership on ideologue Yuldashev at the end of the 1990s. Namangani’s importance as a military
figure made him a legend in the eyes of Central Asian fighters—an Islamist Che Guevara—and he
was much more charismatic than Yuldashev. All this meant that Yuldashev became less influential in
the organization. Hence, to some extent part of the IMU had an initial impulse toward appeasement
and moderation, linked to the Tajik example, demonstrating that forcing a post-Soviet regime to
share power was possible; but that impulse was soon quelled by the uncompromising policy of the
Uzbek government, by Namangani’s equally uncompromising attitude, and by the Taliban.
Moreover, the influence of the most extremist Taliban figures soon made itself felt. Even more
marked was the presence of Afghan Arabs, who were often jihadists linked to al-Qaeda. The Taliban
leadership encouraged the IMU in its “holy war” against the Uzbek regime. After all, it was the
Taliban’s Mullah Omar who allowed the Uzbek Islamists to launch attacks into Central Asia and use
a military training camp in Afghanistan.
Links between the Uzbek Islamists and the Taliban were nothing new. Among the IMU fighters were
Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Uighurs who had found refuge in the religious schools of Jamaat-i-Ulema, the
Islamic movement that shaped the Taliban’s ideology. In the 1990s, several hundred IMU militants
attended these madrassas.6 This ideological influence was particularly important as the Central
Asian jihadists had no means to finance themselves until the late 1990s. The assistance they
received from Jamaat-i-Ulema was therefore essential. Some funding reportedly came from the
Pakistani secret service, which was still elated about its victory in Afghanistan via the mujahideen
against the Soviet Union.7
Another, more recent source of influence was more radical. Al-Qaeda and Arab jihadists had been
developing links with the IMU since the end of the 1990s, particularly with Namangani, one of the
most charismatic jihadist leaders in exile in Afghanistan at the time.8 But a fellow al-Qaeda militant
and an important theorist of jihadism, Abu Musab al-Suri, was an even stronger influence on the
IMU. He gave regular talks in Uzbek training camps before 2001 , as he considered Central Asia
one of the main fronts for the international jihadist fight and a natural battlefield for the Taliban’s
future emirate.9
Al-Suri’s influence strengthened a tendency among IMU fighters to view themselves as part of a
struggle that went beyond the borders of Uzbekistan and even Central Asia. The IMU saw its fight
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as a clash of civilizations not only with the “near enemy”—Karimov and the Central Asian
republics—but also with the “far enemy”—the United States, Russia, Israel, and the Jews.
Given the IMU’s growing role during the 1990s, one cannot help but suspect the group of a wave of
attacks that took place in 1997 in Uzbekistan and a series of terrorist attacks on February 16, 1999,
in Tashkent.10 The IMU may also have been implicated in attacks in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Uzbekistan between 1999 and 2001 that had been ordered from Afghanistan. By 2000, the
movement had the ability to strike Central Asia while contributing 600 men to the Taliban’s war
against the Northern Alliance, a resistance force backed by states including Russia, India, and Iran.
The IMU had thus become a group with a genuine strike force and proven professionalism.11
Emergence of the Islamic Jihad Union
By the start of this century, the IMU was a force to be taken seriously. It was composed of
professional fighters and had a shrewd military leader in Juma Namangani, who had embraced the
extremist ideology of other jihadists and the Taliban regime of Mullah Omar. Namangani made sure
that the IMU’s attacks would nurture mutual accusations and tensions among the Central Asian
nations, despite calls from Moscow and Washington for enhanced regional cooperation to better
deal with the jihadist threat.
The U.S.-led military campaign against the Afghan Taliban in response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, disrupted the situation permanently. Namangani and hundreds of other IMU
fighters died in combat. Others lost hope and abandoned the movement. But the Uzbek jihadists’
extremist links and the influence they gained in Afghanistan had a lasting impact on the part of the
movement that did not give up the fight.
It is against this backdrop that the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) should be understood. This movement,
born out of a schism in the IMU, emerged as an ideological leap forward. Indeed, after 2001, the
IMU was insufficiently involved in the reconquest of Afghanistan. Of course, the group paid lip
service to the international jihad. For example, during a speech in March 2007, Yuldashev, the
movement’s sole leader since the death of Namangani, claimed that the most important battlefields
after 2001 were in Iraq and Afghanistan. And at least in his speeches, Yuldashev followed bin
Laden’s approach, based on the vision of a clash of civilizations against Jews and Christians, and
thus went beyond the notion of a struggle solely against the Central Asian regimes. Ideologically,
Yuldashev did not diminish the importance of the fight against Karimov and other post-Soviet
leaders. But he saw it as part of a larger  battle between al-Qaeda and other jihadist forces, on the
one hand, and the West and its local dictatorial allies in the Muslim world, on the other.
Yet in practice, after 2001 and the shock of the U.S. campaign against the Taliban and international
jihadism, the IMU was concerned less about ideology and more about survival. The movement
could not entirely pursue its al-Qaedan philosophy against the “far enemy” as the group was too
connected with local issues in tribal areas. Yuldashev chose to concentrate the IMU’s efforts on
Pakistan rather than Afghanistan because Islamabad opposed the presence of foreign fighters on its
territory. The Uzbek jihadists who followed him became closely connected to Pakistan’s
northwestern region of South Waziristan and the local politics among the area’s Pashtun tribes.
From 2002 to 2009, the IMU followed its protector, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, an umbrella
organization for various jihadist/Pashtun radical Islamist movements opposing the legal government
in Pakistan, to defend its local interests and its new safe haven. This policy did not mean
moderation: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s ideology is a mix of anti-Western rhetoric and sectarian
bigotry, and it uses uncompromising violence in its fight against democracy. But Yuldashev’s
decision to prioritize the protection of the IMU’s safe haven in the Pakistani tribal areas imposed
serious limits on the movement’s radicalization, at least until his death in August 2009.
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Links With al-Qaeda
The IJU, by comparison, chose a different path, reflecting the Uzbek jihadists’ years of exile in
Tajikistan and Afghanistan and the influence of al-Suri and other radicals. The split with the IMU was
nonviolent, but while Yuldashev focused on local politics, the IJU has been faithful to al-Suri’s desire
to keep pressuring the Central Asian regimes, one of the main fronts of the international jihad. The
IJU has also fully aligned itself ideologically with al-Qaeda and the most hawkish elements of the
Taliban since its inception in 2002–2004.
The IJU’s members focused in particular on the jihadist war for control of Afghanistan. Indeed, the
IJU’s protector in North Waziristan, the part of the Pakistani tribal areas where the militants lived,
was the Haqqani network. Since the mid-1980s, this part of the Afghan Taliban has had close links
with foreign jihadists who would become al-Qaeda.
Today, the IJU is the main supporter of extremists from outside Afghanistan, and its relationship with
al-Qaeda is extremely strong. Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the network, “sees himself in
‘grandiose religious terms,’ a product of his close contact with radicalized Arabs in his youth.” He
depends heavily on radicalized foreigners for manpower against a population that does not support
him in southeastern Afghanistan, the Haqqani network’s territory. He also relies on them as
business partners for his economic activities, which include donations, extortions, and smuggling.
In sum, the IJU is composed of radicals influenced by the most extremist jihadist voices of the
2000s. That explains why since the beginning, the IJU has chosen tactics and rhetoric that mirrored
those of al-Qaeda: suicide bombings and a transnational approach, despite the movement’s
particular interest in continuing to fight the Uzbek regime. The Uzbeks have been the best terrorist
auxiliaries of the Haqqani network and have been responsible for several suicide bomb attacks in
Afghanistan.
High-Profile Terrorist Attacks
Since 2008, the IJU, like al-Qaeda, has understood the need for publicity around terrorist attacks.
The movement has released many videos promoting the individuals who carry out its suicide
bombings, confirming that the IJU was behind them. The IJU claimed credit for the first suicide
attacks in Central Asia in March and April 2004 and, with the bombings of the U.S. and Israeli
embassies in Tashkent in July 2004, for the first successful attacks against the “far enemy” in the
region.12
Whether or not the IJU was involved in therebellion (or massacre) in the Uzbek city of Andijan in
May 2005 is open to doubt, to say the least. But the group nevertheless claimed credit for it in May
2009 in a propaganda video in Arabic and Uzbek with Russian subtitles. The former head of the
IMU’s counterintelligence service, known only as Mosikhuranov, confirmed the IJU’s involvement
during an interviewin April 2006.
The then Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov did not explicitly declare the IJU responsible, but
claimed that the Russians had “fairly reliable information. What happened in Andijan was
orchestrated from the territory of Afghanistan.” This statement makes the IMU or the IJU culpable
from a Russian point of view. Yet without access to more sources from Uzbekistan itself, it must be
borne in mind that those who claim the IJU was responsible for the events in Andijan all have a
political interest in talking of an Islamist plot. But such declarations—in Ivanov’s case, made in an
official context at the NATO-Russia Council—should not be entirely dismissed as ludicrous. After all,
the IJU has been capable of spectacular terrorist acts before.
In fact, the IJU has been ambitious enough to plan at least one major attack outside South or
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Central Asia, even if it failed. In September 2007, one German of Turkish descent and two German
converts to Islam were arrested for being part of a terrorist cell directly linked to the IJU. Their plan
was to bomb the U.S. Air Force base in Ramstein in southwestern Germany, as well as U.S. and
Uzbek diplomatic buildings. The terrorists’ goal was twofold. First, they sought to force the closure of
the Uzbek base of Termez, used by the German Army when it traveled to northern Afghanistan.
Second, they wanted to make the Germans understand the cost of fighting in Afghanistan and
remind Karimov that even though the Uzbek jihadists had to focus on the Afghan fight, they had not
forgotten their main goal of regime change in Uzbekistan.
The threat was very serious. The three terrorists had access to 1,600 pounds of chemicals based on
hydrogen peroxide. With such a product, they could have made bombs with a higher explosive
power than those used in the terrorist bombings of Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005. The
choice of hydrogen peroxide showed the cell’s level of professionalism, as a complex procedure is
required to convert the chemical into explosives. The three terrorists definitely acquired this
expertise from training in an IJU camp in the Pakistani tribal areas.
The discovery of an IJU cell in the West revealed that the movement had been recruiting far from
Central Asia, notably from within Germany’s Turkish community, and had become a  “Turkic”
al-Qaeda.13 The IJU’s membership is unquestionably small, but it is nevertheless real and very
active. The group is still focused on Uzbekistan, and its primary fight is currently in Afghanistan, but
it sees the latter struggle as part of a clash of civilizations—in the same way that al-Qaeda views its
own operations there.
The IMU and IJU Converge
With the death of Tahir Yuldashev in 2009, the IMU’s exclusive focus on local affairs in tribal areas
disappeared, and the group chose to follow a path similar to that of the IJU. This shift was due to
Abu Usman Adil, the IMU’s leader from September 2009 until he was killed by a U.S. drone strike in
April 2012. Usman Adil decided to make the IMU part of the fight on the Afghan battlefield against
NATO forces.
That decision was linked to the IMU’s wish to refocus on targeting the Central Asian regimes, as the
IJU had done. The IMU’s twin desires—to fight in Afghanistan for the Taliban and to be active
against the region’s regimes—are clearly connected, as the IMU and Central Asian jihadists in
general often act in the name of the Taliban, mostly in northern Afghanistan. Taliban leaders
particularly active there since 2010 are often IMU fighters with a double affiliation.
Like the IJU, the IMU has claimed responsibility for suicide bombings in Afghanistan, for example
those in Parwan or Panjshir Provinces in 2011. The IMU distinguishes itself slightly from the IJU by
having a stronger anti-Pakistani rhetoric. During a sermon in a mosque in Pakistan in September
2011, the IMU’s main ideologue, Abu Dher Azzam, insisted that the movement would continue to
stay active in the fight against Islamabad until the “brutal end of Pakistani security and secret
services.”
But in fact, there are no real differences between the positions of the IJU and the IMU toward
Pakistan. With its Afghan fight, the IJU has also considered Islamabad an enemy. In October 2006,
the IJU organized three terrorist attacks in Pakistan: two near the residence of Pervez Musharraf,
the Pakistani president at the time; and one failed attempt against the headquarters of the Pakistani
intelligence services in Islamabad.
Targeting Pakistan makes sense for the IMU as well as for the IJU. Both groups seek not only to
defend a safe haven in the country but also to fight for the recapture of Afghanistan as a whole.
Only with the Taliban’s total victory could the Central Asian jihadists ensure they have solid allies
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and a real safe haven from which to strike their home countries.
But with their hands full in Afghanistan, can these movements really target Central Asia? They
already have, to some extent. In 2009 and 2010, Central Asian jihadists based in Afghanistan and
Pakistan infiltrated Tajik territory. Of course, the tensions were not only fueled by outsiders: local
Tajiks appear to have been stirred up by the local regime, using the IMU’s banner and jihadist
ideology as an expression of their revolt against the state.
Indeed, beyond the risk of external infiltration, there is clearly a small but real presence of local IMU
cells, at least in northern Tajikistan. Militants targeted by the police on suspicion of being part of
such cells have confirmed their involvement by using deadly force to resist arrest in January 2013.
The conservative Tajik district of Istaravshan was the headquarters of a local jihadist cell that
organized a suicide bombing in Khujand, the provincial capital of northern Tajikistan. If the Central
Asian jihadists in Afghanistan and Pakistan are able to become more active in the area as of 2015,
they will find natural allies among the local populations.
Professionalized Terrorist Forces—but With Major Weaknesses
Particularly worrisome for Afghan, Pakistani, and Central Asian officials is the fact that the IMU, the
IJU, and other Central Asian jihadists are among the most professional terrorist forces in this part of
the world today. These movements’ integration into the Taliban in northern Afghanistan, including at
the level of the leadership, is proof enough of their major role. Further evidence is provided by the
IMU’s responsibility for an attack on Karachi airport in June 2014. The IMU seems to have been the
main force behind the attack, which was carried out by a hit squad working with Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan and probably with other jihadist local forces as well.
Central Asian jihadists have therefore demonstrated their professionalism, and their recent actions
prove that they are a potent threat not just in Central Asia but also in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Yet
the region’s jihadist movements also have three major weaknesses that make them unable to
destabilize Karimov or any other local leaders using only their own forces.
The first disadvantage that jihadists in Central Asia have is that, like jihadists elsewhere, they
comprise only a small number of activists. The figures cited most frequently in the second half of the
2000s were 1,000–2,000 Uzbeks in Pakistan with ties to the IMU, the IJU, and other factions. As
Uzbek jihadists have always attracted followers from elsewhere in Central Asia, there is a tendency
to inflate that figure by up to 1,000. Syed Saleem Shahzad, an expert on terrorism in Pakistan, puts
the number at 2,500.
The non-Uzbeks are even less numerous. There are no more than 200–300 Kazakh jihadists, for
example, most of whom are active in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The number of Central Asians in
Afghanistan and Pakistan can be reliably put at 2,000–3,000, even though there has been a high
turnover since the fall of the Soviet Union. The figure of 10,000 jihadists, cited by some journalists
following the thunderous declarations of certain jihadists and Taliban figures, does not correspond to
any concrete data. With such numbers, the IMU and other jihadists may at best be a source of
pressure, tensions, and terrorism, but not of forced political change.
The jihadists’ second weakness is their inability to develop and organize themselves far from home.
That has had a tremendous impact on recruitment: jihadist foot soldiers are decreasingly
post-Soviet Central Asians and increasingly Afghans. Given this situation, despite the jihadists’
rhetoric, it might be difficult for the IMU’s Uzbek leadership to motivate their troops to fight against
Tashkent.
The third disadvantage is a lack of centralization. The most important of the Central Asian jihadist
groups, the IMU, is active in Afghanistan and Pakistan and seems to have local cells in post-Soviet
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Central Asia or the capacity to intervene there. That appears to be a sign that the group is less
centralized than it used to be. This development may make the IMU more dangerous as a criminal
and terrorist organization, but it will also make it less able, over time, to focus only on Central Asia.
That problem will be compounded, as most of the IMU’s foot soldiers are no longer Central Asians.
In sum, a number of points should be kept in mind about Uzbek and Central Asian jihadism in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most importantly, these Islamists are a threat that should not be
underestimated. The IMU and the IJU are composed of professional terrorists who have not
forgotten their desire to destabilize Central Asia’s regimes.
At the same time, this threat is severely limited by the fact that the movements involved have been
forced to develop overseas. Central Asian jihadists have to prioritize other fights in Afghanistan and
Pakistan to survive, support their allies, and prepare for a time when they will be able to launch
successful attacks in Uzbekistan and elsewhere in Central Asia. The geographical distances
involved and the groups’ limited numbers make Central Asian jihadists unable to undertake any kind
of regime change by themselves.
The Withdrawal of Western Troops From Afghanistan
All Central Asian countries have repeatedly expressed their concern about what might happen to
Afghanistan after the NATO-led security mission leaves the country at the end of 2014. In December
2012, the Uzbek president was very explicit about the potential threat, and he invited the
international community to launch a dialogue under UN auspices to resolve the problems that he
expected to encounter after the withdrawal of the international coalition from Afghanistan.
The Kyrgyz authorities were equally direct, stating that all threats to their country’s security would
come from Afghanistan and from the chaos that would inevitably follow the withdrawal of Western
troops. Tajikistan, which shares a long border with Afghanistan, frequently expresses its fears about
the situation after 2014. Even Kazakhstan, which does not border Afghanistan, has raised some
concerns.
Only Turkmenistan, the one Central Asian state that maintained regular relations with the Taliban
before their fall in 2001, has been unconcerned by the withdrawal. But Turkmens might soon sound
more alarmist, as Turkmen border guards were attacked, and three of them killed, at the Afghan-
Turkmen frontier in February 2014. The Taliban have denied responsibility for this attack, but their
arguments were unconvincing, to say the least.14
Central Asian jihadists are not a threat to be taken lightly. But their importance should not be blown
out of proportion either. It is as much a mistake to underestimate them as it is to assign them a level
of importance they cannot claim to have nowadays. To better assess the impact that Central Asian
jihadists could have as of 2015, one needs to go beyond what is known about the jihadist groups
themselves. More significant is the potential creation of a link between Central and South Asia that
could be useful to the jihadists.
Drug Trafficking, Ethnic Links, and Porous Borders
The Central Asian countries have sound reasons to worry about the future of Afghanistan. Many of
the tensions and security concerns these states have experienced since their independence from
the Soviet Union have been linked to the Afghan conflict. The most credible jihadist threat in the
region, the IMU, developed partly through its links with Afghanistan. But security issues in Central
Asia are not only linked to jihadism.
Drug Trafficking
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Afghanistan is the world’s leading opium producer and exports its products in part through the
Central Asian republics. Since 2001, the amount of opium and heroin produced in northern
Afghanistan has grown considerably. Heroin production there reached 160 tons in 2004,
representing a third of the global output of the drug. There are active heroin laboratories in
Afghanistan’s northern Kunduz province, a territory where the Taliban and the IMU have reemerged
since 2009, and where they are believed to at least partly control the local heroin production.
The involvement of the IMU and the Taliban in drug production and trafficking in Kunduz is nothing
new. Indeed, it is hard to see how the Central Asian jihadist movement could fund itself without such
activities. By the late 1990s, drug trafficking had become enormously important for the IMU. From
1997 to 2001, the movement had gained a foothold in drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Central
Asia, with the blessing of its Taliban allies.
During this period, Yuldashev grew particularly close to the Taliban’s northern commander, Mullah
Dadullah. Together, they developed transit routes through Central Asia for drugs destined for the
Russian and European markets. A sizable amount of heroin was already being produced in Kunduz
at the time. The money from this lucrative traffic helped pay corrupt officials, especially in
Turkmenistan, to ensure that security forces would not hinder the transportation of narcotics. Of
course, extremists could also take the routes used for heroin trafficking, even after 2001.
One may wonder whether drug trafficking is just a means to an end for the IMU, or whether the
group would best be described as “narcoterrorists,” engaged in trafficking as much as in jihadism.
After all, the IMU’s major military campaign in 1999 was carried out to protect this lucrative
business. Officials observed at the time that for reasons that were initially inexplicable, Namangani
had focused his attacks on Kyrgyzstan rather than moving on quickly to Uzbekistan, which was
supposed to be his main target.
The reason for Namangani’s tactics was to protect the channels for drug trafficking. In 1999, the
Kyrgyz security services managed to seriously disrupt the transit of Afghan heroin through their
territory. At that time, the jihadists controlled up to 70 percent of the traffic. When the Taliban banned
poppy cultivation in 2000, the IMU alone had a stock of at least 240 tons of the product, which gives
an idea of the group’s role in drug trafficking before the fall of the Afghan “emirate.” From this
perspective, with the jihadists also operating as drug traffickers, the aim of their fight is not only
political but also economic.
Nothing much has changed in the region. The Haqqani network—allies and protectors of the IMU
and the IJU in Afghanistan and Pakistan—operate in the same way as before, organizing attacks on
NATO and the regular Afghan forces. The stability of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, as
well as the influence of organized crime networks in the region, is directly linked to drug trafficking
from Afghanistan, which NATO has not been able to eradicate. This defeat may have a high cost for
the area’s future and makes it necessary to redefine the jihadist threat. The real challenge that
post-Soviet Central Asia must deal with after 2014 is less ideological and religious than political. In
particular, it relates to organized crime.
Drug trafficking is certainly an important tool that partly explains the strength of the IMU and of the
Taliban. But it would be a mistake to perceive the threat of the drug trade only through the prism of
Islamist radicalism. Indeed, trafficking can have an indirect impact that could be useful for jihadists
but also any other political force wishing to destabilize the present order. Such trafficking
strengthens local mafias and feeds corruption to an extent that could alter the way in which
judiciaries, security forces, and political actors operate. In the longer term, that could lead citizens to
question the very legitimacy of the state.
Tajikistan offers a clear example of the scale of such corruption. Between 2004 and 2009, heroin
seizures in the country fell dramatically—from 10,569 pounds to 2,496 pounds—at a time when
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there was actually an increase in drug trafficking through Central Asia. Corrupt officials are known to
have been implicated in most of this trafficking—reaping much more significant kickbacks than the
benefits made by nonstate actors.
Drugs are indeed a tool for jihadists, but terrorist groups are only a small part of the problem coming
out of Afghanistan. Central Asian regimes exaggerate the link between terrorism and drug trafficking
in an effort to make Westerners forget the scale of corruption in their states.
Ethnic Links
Central Asian leaders and several experts believe that the departure of most Western troops from
Afghanistan by the end of 2014 will result in the return of the Taliban to power. At the very least, the
withdrawal of the NATO-led coalition will lead to the loss of pressure exerted by Western forces on
the Central Asian jihadists who had sought refuge in Afghanistan. This, the governments of Central
Asia fear, will enable the likes of the IMU and IJU to shift their efforts back to Central Asia and once
again launch attacks against the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik regimes.
But could the jihadists make use of natural ethnic ties between northern Afghanistan and Central
Asia—that is, between Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen Afghans, on the one hand, and their northern
brethren, on the other? After all, Uzbek Afghans play an important role in the IMU. Could this
“indigenization” of Central Asian jihadist groups be an advantage for their infiltration, or would it be a
source of difficulties?
The Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmens of Afghanistan are indeed close to their independent brothers in
the north. But this linguistic, cultural, and even religious proximity should not overshadow the many
differences that have arisen between these groups over the decades. Separated by geographic,
economic, social, and ideological borders since the Russian and then the Soviet conquest, these
communities have evolved in socially, culturally, and politically diverse ways. Since the end of the
emirates and khanates of Central Asia in the nineteenth century, Russian and especially Soviet
culture have alienated the Uzbek, Turkmen, and Tajik populations from their kin across the Amu
Darya in Afghanistan.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 reestablished ties between the peoples of Afghanistan
and Central Asia. But these relations were short-lived, were beset with conflict, and in no way
contributed to a rapprochement among Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen forces. To the contrary, years of
conflict exacerbated the divide between the two sides of the Amu Darya. And after twenty years of
independence, the societies of Central Asia considered Afghan society utterly foreign. The elites as
well as the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik people continued to have a negative if not hostile image of
Afghanistan, which was fostered by the regimes in power, who constantly invoked the threat of
Afghanization.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, there was certainly a religious resurgence in Central Asia, but it
had more to do with establishing an identity than with any foreign influence—particularly from the
south. Identifying oneself as Muslim was a way to distinguish oneself from the dominant Russian
culture. Even that should be kept in perspective, however, as the search for a new identity was first
and foremost connected to a particular period—the early 1990s—and did not stand in the way of
genuine secularization, especially in the cities. So even the return of religious figures in the early
days of independence did not lead to a spiritual rapprochement with the Central Asian populations’
southern brothers in Afghanistan.
Uzbekistan offers a stark example of this lack of interest in ethnic ties with Afghanistan, except as a
tool to protect the homeland. The most populous country in the region, with the greatest number of
minorities, Uzbekistan never had a real policy of rapprochement with ethnic Uzbeks or Uzbek
diaspora movements. Indeed, Karimov always mistrusted the nationalist or Islamic ideas of the
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Uzbeks of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Afghanistan.
Relations between Tashkent and the Afghan warlord Rashid Dostum could best be described as an
alliance of convenience; Tashkent only approached this local potentate out of the need to defend
itself from various Afghan threats, without any desire to change this short-term diplomatic tactic into
an ethnic diplomatic strategy. In fact, Dostum traveled more often to Turkey than to Uzbekistan and
did not feel any particular allegiance to his northern ethnic patrons.
Porous Borders
While ethnic ties might not offer Central Asian jihadists any support, it is reasonable to believe that
infiltration is possible. The jihadists have already shown that they can return home through other
countries, or at least create trouble at the border. The Turkmen-Afghan frontier is one such case.
For now, Ashgabat seems to have found a solution to protect its border: 120 Afghan Turkmens,
armed with submachine guns, patrol the border from the Afghan side.
The Turkmen government has also decided to involve itself in the Afghan peace process. Ashgabat
offered its services to the Afghan High Peace Council as an honest broker between the Taliban and
Kabul, volunteering to host talks between the two parties in Ashgabat and to let the Taliban open a
consulate in Turkmenistan. This shows the true concern of a Central Asian country for Afghanistan’s
stability but also an understanding that the use of force to protect the border might not be enough to
avoid an Afghan “contamination.”
Another porous border between Afghanistan and Central Asia is that of Tajikistan. If faced with a
full-fledged invasion from Afghanistan, the Tajik Army would be efficient—much more so than it used
to be—and would receive Russian military support. But a cataclysmic spillover is unlikely; rather,
events would follow historical precedents of infiltration.
The geography of the Tajik-Afghan border allows militants from Afghanistan to enter Tajikistan
without difficulty. The Panj River, which forms the frontier, is easy to cross. It separates the former
independent principality of Darvaz, on the Afghan side, from Tajikistan’s Darvaz District, which is
mostly Sunni (an exception in the Badakhshan region, which is mostly Shia Muslim from the Ismaili
sect) and was a stronghold of the Islamist movement during the Tajik Civil War of 1992–1997. Even
since 1997, the Darvaz District has been known for its high level of radical Islamist agitation.
More broadly, there have been examples of intrusion from Afghanistan into Central Asia that are not
necessarily directly linked to the IMU or the IJU but that prove the porous nature of the borders
between these post-Soviet republics and their southern neighbor. In March 2013, an Uzbek patrol
opposed 30 Afghans who had entered Uzbek territory illegally with hostile intentions, attacking the
patrol and attempting to seize its weapons. The patrol was able to push back the Afghans after
killing four of them. Between January and March 2013 alone, 106 Afghans were detained after 22
failed attempts to enter Uzbekistan illegally.
It would be a mistake to talk about ethnic sympathies between Central Asians and Tajik or Uzbek
Afghans that could be exploited by jihadists seeking to return home. However, there are two ties to
Central Asian territories that could help the IMU and IJU: the impact of drug trafficking from
Afghanistan to Central Asia and the post-Soviet space; and the porosity of the region’s borders.
These are two issues that have nothing to do with religion or ideology and everything to do with
social, political, and security issues in the region.
Central Asian Islam and Exaggerated Official Rhetoric
A Moderate Form of Islam
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The danger of Islamist contamination in Central Asian states seems less credible in light of these
countries’ religious policies and shifts in the balance of power between the various forms of Islam to
which the region’s societies adhere. Support for radical Islam, which never enjoyed the clear
backing of the local populations, has experienced a dramatic decline overall, as witnessed by a
gradual diminution of jihadist attacks since the beginning of 2000s. Even the nonjihadist
fundamentalists of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a pan-Islamic political organization once quite popular in several
Central Asian cities, are running out of steam. That is partly because of a crackdown on Islamic
fundamentalism, and partly because local societies are uninterested in this movement, whose
characteristics are more Marxist-Leninist than Islamist.
There are several reasons for this decline in radical and fundamentalist Islam. Some of these
motives are directly linked to the individual nations concerned and their management of this
religious phenomenon. A crackdown by the Central Asian regimes on Islamism contributed
significantly to the movement’s decline, although certain excesses sometimes fueled or radicalized
its more moderate elements.
The Central Asian regimes, forced to assert their national legitimacy through their ethnic and
religious identities, have themselves Islamized to a certain degree. Uzbekistan, the most populous
and most Muslim country in the region, offers a good example of this phenomenon of voluntary
“self-Islamization” to better combat radical Islam. The Islamization of Karimov’s regime follows the
same logic with which the government muzzled the nationalist opposition in the early 1990s by
appropriating its nationalist ideas.15
The Uzbek regime has created new Islamic establishments all around the country to form Islamic
elites tasked with developing a tolerant version of Islam compatible with the state’s religious policy.
That is not to say that Karimov has become an Islamist, but he manages the issue by encouraging
the renewal of a certain type of state-sponsored Islam. The government has therefore rehabilitated
the practices, symbols, and sites that are important to Islam and has inaugurated Islamic schools
such as the Tashkent Islamic University and a number of small and medium-sized madrassas.
As a result, Karimov is perceived as being respectful of traditional Uzbek Islam, particularly Sufism.
This wins him some popular support among those for whom being Uzbek means being Muslim,
traditional, moderate, Sunni, apolitical, and deferential toward the country’s deep-rooted tradition of
brotherhood. To some extent, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have also instituted this voluntary
Islamization from above to confront the rise of radical Islamism from below. In this way, they have
promoted—with some success—a new national, broadly ethnic Islam.
At the same time, this religious policy has not kept the Central Asian regimes from cracking down on
anything that might directly or indirectly resemble radical Islam. Yet overall, the approach of
governments in the region has promoted a moderate Islam that largely satisfies the religious
demands of much of the population. After twenty years of independence and Islamic cooperation
with a number of Muslim countries, the states of Central Asia have undergone a largely moderate
Islamization of their societies.
The progress of this phenomenon can be measured by the popularity of Islamic trends from Turkey.
That country’s Diyanet, an official body that oversees relations among Muslim institutions, the state,
and society, has left its imprint on Central Asian Islam. Apart from Uzbekistan, which has very poor
relations with Turkey, all the countries of the region have enjoyed the Diyanet’s support and
expertise in the creation of a national Islam in the service of the state and in harmony with the ruling
political power. The activism of the Diyanet and a multitude of private movements has helped
educate of a new generation of religious elites capable of responding to the challenges of radical
preachers.
Turkey is not the only source of inspiration for the Central Asian republics, but it has been the most
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active. Turkey’s efforts have been the most effective as the country has benefited from the
numerous affinities—particularly linguistic—between Turkish and Central Asian societies. The
Turkish model for managing the religious question has made headway in Central Asia without
governments always recognizing it.
The impact of the Turkish model has been acknowledged and even asserted by representatives of
political Islam. In Tajikistan, the leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party, the only party in Central
Asia to embrace political Islam, explicitly states that it models itself on Turkey’s Justice and
Development Party (AKP). But once the AKP model, which may be seen as a compromise between
Islam, democracy, economic prosperity, and a successful foreign policy, began to falter, the region’s
Islamic leaders ceased to mention it.
Disconnected From South Asian Influences
The weakness of trade and, consequently, human exchanges between Central and South Asia
makes the risk of imported Islamic radicalization from South into Central Asia unlikely. Central
Asians have a negative image of South Asia and of Afghan and Pakistani influences. To their way of
thinking, marked as it is by European culture as a consequence of Russian and Soviet domination,
the south is synonymous with barbarism, while they consider themselves more moderate and
civilized. While religious relations between the two regions used to be intense, due to India’s Mughal
heritage, even the most moderate Islamic influences from the Indian subcontinent have been seen
in a bad light since the end of the Soviet era.
A good example of this trend is the lukewarm reception extended to the Tablighi Jamaat Islamic
religious movement, which has struggled to establish itself in Central Asia under the watchful eye of
the authorities and the local population. Registered in Kyrgyzstan, tolerated in Kazakhstan, and
banned in other republics, Tablighi Jamaat has had a hard time taking root in Central Asia precisely
because it comes from the “retrograde,” suspect south. And yet it hardly advocates any radical
discourse that is aggressive toward these nations, whose legitimacy—and whose ways of defining
and enforcing a certain Islamic norm—it recognizes.
The societies of Central Asia seem relatively impermeable to any Islamic influence from the south,
particularly its more radical aspects. So is it far-fetched to ask whether local Islamic movements that
once sought refuge in Afghanistan might return to Central Asia? Not completely. But here too, there
is an attitude of real dislocation or even alienation toward Central Asian jihadist militants operating
on the Afghan-Pakistani border.
Exaggerated Official Rhetoric
It is difficult not to consider official Central Asian rhetoric about post-2014 Afghanistan and the
country’s impact on its neighborhood as somewhat exaggerated. The region’s regimes strongly
inflate, or at least overestimate, the Islamist threat for many reasons and political calculations, which
fall under two categories: promoting national interests abroad and suppressing Islamist opposition
at home.
First and foremost, throughout the region, alarmist discourse is designed to serve national interests
by ensuring the cooperation and support of the West but also of Russia and China. The Central
Asian governments seek such backing to promote their own development and that of the region and
to increase their visibility on the regional and international scene.
U.S. military bases in Bishkek, Khanabad, and Karshi have been major sources of hard currency for
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In Kyrgyzstan, the base at Manas contributed $200 million a year to
Bishkek’s government budget—no less than 3.3 percent of the total—and provided 700 jobs for the
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locals. The closure of the base in June 2014 was acceptable to Kyrgyzstan only because U.S.
presence has made Russia, and to some extent China, eager to be more supportive toward
Kyrgyzstan in terms of financial assistance and trade opportunities.16
In addition to their economic and financial interests, the countries of Central Asia that border
Afghanistan have been able to benefit from their location and role as a transit area for personnel
and military equipment. Without the Western-led intervention in Afghanistan, these small, isolated
countries would never have enjoyed regular bilateral consultations with the United States, the EU,
Russia, and China. The war in Afghanistan made it possible for the Central Asian states to emerge
from their regional isolation. These young regimes continue to exploit the issue of Afghanistan,
including the associated risks and security threats, to negotiate for the development aid and political
support they need to establish their sovereignty and legitimacy on the world stage.
The second reason that Central Asian governments exaggerate the so-called Islamist threat is
domestic. Regimes seek to maintain pressure on, and justify the repression of, any form of Islamist
opposition that runs counter to the norms established by the official, state-imposed brand of Islam.
This traditional, moderate form of Islam, which is best suited to the culture of the majority of the
population, is imposed by force and rejects any other version or practice of the religion. All those,
including religious authorities, who want to practice their religion more autonomously are
discouraged from doing so. This tight social control spills over to all forms of opposition, including
political opposition, and undermines all demands for political reform.
This suppression of domestic opposition should make any analyst question the very notion of
“exaggeration” in this context. Western observers tend to take for granted that authoritarian regimes
exaggerate threats on purpose. But is that really the case? Do authoritarian regimes have a good
enough understanding of their societies and their own internal evolutions to have a true sense of
what is going on?
Central Asian regimes operate by indiscriminately repressing any force that can destabilize the
social and political order. Anyone who wants to practice Islam independently or link it to a particular
political philosophy will be targeted as much as criminals or terrorists. That explains why the Kyrgyz
and Uzbek authorities consider Tabligh Jamaat an extremist organization and a source of concern.
This is a peculiar political choice given that the Central Asian regimes have adopted a policy toward
opposition and religion that is similar to the approach pursued in the Arab world shortly after its
independence from colonial rule. It is a policy based on the crushing of any type of opposition or
independent thinking, with no distinction between moderates and extremists, and a desire to control
religious expression.
Such an approach helped the IMU emerge in Central Asia, and it is responsible for the appearance
of al-Qaeda in the Arab world and of other violent groups in Algeria and Egypt. It is fair to suppose
that Arab and Central Asian authoritarian leaders did not wish for violent opposition to appear.
Rather, the nature of these regimes and the way they work bring about bad policies. Authoritarian
regimes refuse to give their citizens political rights, they choose indoctrination and fear over
consultation, and they breed violence on their territories. By operating in that way, authoritarian
regimes cannot truly understand developments in their own societies.
So even if Central Asian states manipulate the situation in an attempt to obtain the support and
money of others, they do not exaggerate the threat. In a way, the situation is much more
disconcerting: they are simply unable to perceive the threat. That makes the question marks over
the future of Afghanistan—a safe haven for Central Asian radicals so close to home—genuinely
threatening.
Conclusion
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The gradual withdrawal of NATO-led forces from Afghanistan is currently the most widely debated
political event in Central Asia. Governments, diplomats, and security analysts are constantly
speculating about the consequences of the drawdown for Central Asian societies. It is simplistic to
assert that the departure of Western troops will have no negative impact. Until Afghanistan is truly
stabilized under a political actor who is strong and willing enough to target and eliminate Central
Asian jihadism and its allies, Kabul’s problems will have an effect on the country’s northern
neighbors.
However, the idea that jihadist forces wishing to target the Central Asian regimes will sweep into the
Fergana Valley on January 1, 2015, and turn it into a new tribal area or a new Afghanistan is sheer
fantasy. The Taliban have been able to count on ethnic and tribal structures as well as on Pashtun
nationalism, which made it possible for the movement to have a lasting impact.
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union are indeed dangerous groups.
But so far, they have not had the same impact on Central Asian nations as the Taliban. The IMU and
the IJU are well trained and closely connected to transnational jihadism and al-Qaeda, and they
have the professionalism required to strike in their post-Soviet homelands. But a massive spillover
from Afghanistan and Pakistan that would destabilize the region’s leaders is a pipe dream.
In fact, the impact of these groups will be as significant as the Central Asian regimes allow it to be.
The jihadists that threaten them are doomed to remain small groups, as Central Asian societies are
clearly unwilling to follow the militants’ extremist political path.
The governments of the region have a great opportunity after 2014. The regimes must institute the
necessary police and border-control operations to avoid incursions. At the same time, they must get
serious about the other problems emanating from Afghanistan, including drug trafficking, and work
within the framework of international bodies such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to
stabilize their southern neighbor. And they must resist the temptation to disproportionately assert the
jihadist danger abroad. Above all, they must focus on developing domestic policies that take full
account of the social and economic issues that could provide the jihadists with new recruits in the
future.
Central Asian leaders need to learn from their own past mistakes, and from those of Arab
authoritarian regimes, and adopt a reformist mind-set in the way they deal with political and religious
affairs. It will probably take a generational change for this lesson to be truly understood. Repression
of opposition and the promotion of local Islam have worked in the short term, but such tools might
not be enough in the longer term.
Unfortunately, as the issue of Afghanistan is so close to home, Central Asian leaders might not have
the luxury of time to change their ways. After 2014, the region’s governments will need to decide
whether to stay the course or to adopt a more reformist path. The latter choice could help safeguard
Central Asia’s stability while Afghanistan gradually rebuilds itself.
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